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Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance 
Edward Rock1 
Abstract: This chapter examines the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance and whether regulation is likely to encourage them to become active 
stewards. It considers the lessons that can be learned from the US experience for the EU’s 
2014 proposed amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive. After reviewing how 
institutional investors fit within the historical evolution of finance, the chapter documents 
the growth in institutions equity holdings over time. It explains how institutional 
investors are governed and organize share voting before turning to two competing 
hypotheses to account for the relative passivity of institutional investors: the excessive 
regulation and the inadequate incentives hypotheses. In evaluating these hypotheses, it 
reviews the results of the SEC’s attempt to incentivize mutual funds to vote their shares. 
The chapter concludes by highlighting the role of hedge funds in catalyzing institutional 
shareholders, along with some of the risks associated with such highly incentivized 
actors. 
Keywords: institutional investors, corporate governance, regulation, EU, Shareholder 
Rights Directive, share voting, incentives, Securities and Exchange Commission, mutual 
funds, hedge funds 
1. Introduction 
Shareholders—the corporate governance framework is built on the 
assumption that shareholders engage with companies and hold the 
management to account for its performance. However, there is evidence 
that the majority of shareholders are passive and are often only focused on 
 
 
short-term profits. It therefore seems useful to consider whether more 
shareholders can be encouraged to take an interest in sustainable returns 
and longer term performance, and how to encourage them to be more 
active on corporate governance issues.2 
Like poets and revolutionaries, corporate law scholars and policy makers dream. If only 
we could find the silver bullet, the wonder drug, we could solve the manager-shareholder 
agency cost problem that is the focus of much of corporate law. For a while in the 1980s, 
some thought that the hostile tender offer was that magic potion. Then, beginning in the 
late 1980s, attention shifted to institutional investors, where it has stayed, on and off, ever 
since. Noting that shares of publicly held corporations are largely held by institutions, 
and that shareholding among institutions is concentrated, some have viewed institutional 
investors as having the potential to act as the responsible owners that corporate law seems 
to presume: shareholders that, by virtue of their holdings, will have the skills and 
incentives to keep an eye on managers and check departures from maximizing firm value, 
to prevent “short termism,” and to do whatever else one wants responsible owners to do. 
As with other utopian dreams, reality has proved to be less exciting and less 
transformative. In this chapter, I try to synthesize what we have learned about 
institutional investors in corporate governance over the last 30 years or so. 
2. Who and what are “institutional investors”? 
Robert Clark provides a basic framework for understanding how institutional investors fit 
within the historical evolution of finance.3 The first stage, characteristic of the nineteenth 
century, was the age of the promoter-investor-manager, exemplified by Rockefeller or 
Carnegie. The second stage, characteristic of the first part of the twentieth century, was 
 
 
the age of the professional business manager who took on the management of the 
corporation, while leaving the financial claims to the owners of shares. This stage was 
exemplified by managerial giants such as Alfred Sloan who led the way in creating the 
modern, publicly held business corporation. The third stage, characteristic of the late 
twentieth century, was the age of the portfolio manager in which the selection of the 
financial claims (stock, bonds, etc.) was professionalized, while leaving the beneficial 
ownership to the capital supplier. This age of financial intermediaries is the age of the 
institutional investors, with great stock pickers like Peter Lynch as representative heroes. 
In this age of intermediated finance, the investment function—where to invest 
money that is being saved—is separated from the savings decision, and given to 
professionals, the “money managers.” By professionalizing the investment function, 
which had been bundled with the savings decision, the third stage parallels the 
professionalization of the management function that characterized the second stage of 
capitalism. The most prominent “traditional” intermediaries are public and private 
pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and endowments (collectively 
referred to as “institutional investors”). More recently, as will become apparent later, 
activist hedge funds have emerged as a distinct category of specialized professional 
investors. 
Clark’s description, and the above taxonomy, is most applicable to economies 
with corporations with dispersed public ownership, most prominently the US and the UK. 
In economies dominated by publicly held firms with concentrated ownership, such as the 
countries of continental Europe, this description is less accurate but the trend lines point 
 
 
in the same direction. In this chapter, I primarily focus on the US experience, with 
secondary attention to drawing lessons for the UK and continental Europe.4 
As is now widely recognized, institutional ownership of equities has been 
transformed over the last 60 years. In 1950, institutions held $8.7 billion in equities (6.1% 
of total); in 1980, institutions held $436.2 billion in equity (18% of total); in 2009, they 
held $10.239 trillion (40.4% of total).5 In this growth, mutual funds have been especially 
prominent, going from owning $70 billion in 1980 to $7.2 trillion in 2009.6 
The effect of this growth has been to concentrate ownership of publicly held firms 
in institutional hands. Between 1987 and 2009, the institutional ownership in the top 
1000 US corporations grew from 46.6% to 73%.7 In 2009, the 25 largest corporations by 
market value had an average institutional ownership of over 60%.8 
The concentration of ownership within these firms is impressive as well. Table 1, 
drawn from data in the 2010 Conference Board report, shows institutional ownership in 
the 25 largest corporations, and the ownership of the top five, ten, 20, and 25 institutions 
in each. As this table makes clear, both the level and the concentration of institutional 
ownership in even the largest companies is high. 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
Two factors seem to have driven the trends over time: regulation; and market 
forces. The extraordinary growth of institutional investors in the US owes much to the 
1974 enactment of ERISA which mandated that pension commitments be fully funded by 
segregated pools of assets.9 This led to the creation of independent corporate pension 
funds to fund “defined benefit” plans (in which employees’ pensions were a certain 
percentage of final salary). It also eventually pushed corporations to shift to “defined 
contribution” plans in which the employer and employee each contribute to a tax-
 
 
advantaged retirement account (almost invariably managed by a mutual fund) to support 
the employee after retirement. From an employer’s perspective, the great virtue of a 
“defined contribution” plan is that it is fully funded from the beginning and all 
investment risk falls on the employee. From an employee’s perspective, the benefit of a 
defined contribution plan is complete portability, a significant advantage for a mobile 
workforce. 
At the same time, the growth of institutional investors has made them remarkably 
efficient managers of capital. Vanguard’s Index 500 fund allows investors to invest in a 
basket of securities that tracks the S & P 500 stock index for as low as five basis points 
(i.e., 0.05% per year).10 This extraordinarily low price reflects, among other things, 
massive economies of scale. 
When all these factors are brought together, the critical fact that must ground any 
analysis of corporate governance is the “de-retailization” of the capital markets.11 Any 
sensible discussion must begin from the fact that between 60% and 70% of the shares of 
medium and large public corporations are held by institutional investors, and that even in 
the largest corporations, a significant percentage of the shares are held by a handful of 
investors. 
3. The governance of money managers 
The governance of money managers themselves is quite varied. There are four or five 
different models, as illustrated by some of the leading firms. First, there are for-profit 
asset managers, some of which are publicly held (e.g., BlackRock and State Street are 
both NYSE companies), while others are privately held (e.g., Fidelity Management & 
Research Company, which acts as the investment advisor to Fidelity’s family of mutual 
 
 
funds).12 Included in this group are (for-profit) insurance companies and savings 
institutions. 
Second, there are “mutual” and nonprofit management companies. For example, 
Vanguard’s management company is owned by the Vanguard funds, and thus indirectly 
by Vanguard participants,13 while CREF, the College Retirement Equity Fund, is a 
nonprofit corporation whose trustees are directly elected by participants, with votes 
weighted by dollar amount in an account.14 
Third, there are public-employee pension funds in which the governing managers 
or boards are appointed by politicians or directly elected by voters. At CalPERS, the 
board includes six elected members, three appointed members and four ex officio state 
officials.15 The NYCERS board “consists of eleven members: the Mayor’s 
Representative, the City Comptroller, the Public Advocate, the heads of the three unions 
with the largest number of participating employees, and the five Borough Presidents.”16 
By contrast, the NY State & Local Retirement System is headed by the elected NY State 
Comptroller.17 
Finally, there are the union-related funds that have been prominent governance 
activists. With respect to shareholder proposals, which require minimal investments, the 
AFL-CIO has filed proposals using its $28 million “Reserve Fund.”18 The joint union-
employer pension funds (known as “Taft-Hartley Plans” after the key regulation) 
collectively hold approximately $400 billion in assets (of which $100 billion is in 
common stock), but have not been active, largely because discretion is delegated to 
outside money managers in order to avoid the risk of liability under ERISA. 
 
 
Governance structure affects activism in predictable ways. The union funds 
pursue a labor agenda. The public pension funds respond to political pressure.19 For-
profit money managers such as BlackRock rarely engage in aggressive activism, although 
increasingly they engage with companies and support dissident shareholders.20 
4. The organization of share voting by institutional investors 
With the thousands of public companies held by institutional investors, each with an 
annual meeting and a variety of matters to vote on, voting shares is a huge task. Major 
institutional investors establish dedicated proxy voting departments that are responsible 
for developing voting guidelines and voting proxies. 
To get a sense of how proxy voting is organized at major institutional investors, 
and what sort of people are involved, consider Exxon Mobil’s three largest shareholders: 
BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, each of whom owns more than 3% of the 
company.21 At BlackRock, for example, there is a “Corporate Governance and 
Responsible Investment” (CGRI) team that acts as a central clearinghouse across its 
various portfolios.22 The CGRI team has 20 professionals working out of six offices 
around the world,23 has responsibility for voting proxies, and has developed general 
Proxy Voting Guidelines.24 Since 2009, the group has been headed by Michelle Edkins, 
who has made a career of corporate governance analysis, previously as managing director 
at Governance for Owners and, earlier, as Corporate Governance Director at Hermes in 
London.25 Chad Spitler, Global Chief Operating Officer for the CGRI team has a similar 
background.26 Daniel Oh, VP for the Americas on the CGRI team, was previously part of 
the corporate governance team at State Street, and still earlier was a corporate governance 
advisor at ISS.27 
 
 
At State Street, the: 
Corporate Governance Team is responsible for implementing the Proxy 
Voting and Engagement Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), case-by-case 
voting items, issuer engagement activities, and research and analysis of 
governance-related issues. The implementation of the Guidelines is 
overseen by the SSgA Global Proxy Review Committee (“SSgA PRC”), a 
committee of investment, compliance and legal professionals, who provide 
guidance on proxy issues as described in greater detail below. Oversight of 
the proxy voting process is ultimately the responsibility of the SSgA 
Investment Committee.28 
Rakhi Kumar leads the group as the head of Corporate Governance.29 A Yale MBA, she 
spent time earlier in her career at Proxy Governance Inc. 
At Vanguard, proxy voting is delegated to the “Proxy Voting Group,” which, in 
turn, is overseen by the “Proxy Oversight Committee” made up of senior officers and 
reporting to the board.30 The Proxy Voting Group applies the general proxy voting 
guidelines to specific instances, and is responsible for: 
(1) managing proxy voting vendors; (2) reconciling share positions; (3) 
analyzing proxy proposals using factors described in the guidelines; (4) 
determining and addressing potential or actual conflicts of interest that 
may be presented by a particular proxy; and (5) voting proxies. The Proxy 
Voting Group also prepares periodic and special reports to the Board and 
any proposed amendments to the procedures and guidelines.31 
 
 
The Proxy Voting Group is led by Glen Booraem, who joined Vanguard in 1989 and has 
spent his entire career in fund accounting and administration roles.32 In addition to 
leading Vanguard’s corporate governance program, he is also responsible for fund 
accounting, administration, and compliance services.33 
Other major institutional investors organize the proxy voting/corporate 
governance functions the same way. At Fidelity, Mark Lundvall is the Vice President of 
Investment Proxy Research, having earlier worked on corporate governance and 
compliance at Vanguard.34 Gwen Le Berre, Director of Proxy & Governance at Charles 
Schwab, is responsible for the development of Schwab’s corporate governance policies 
and oversees the implementation of its proxy voting guidelines.35 She came to Schwab 
from BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment group, with 
similar functions at Barclays.36 Not surprisingly, some corporate governance 
professionals have spent time at a proxy advisory firm such as ISS, Proxy Governance 
Inc., or IRRC.37 Public pension funds, such as CalPERS and CalSTRS, approach 
corporate governance and proxy voting in the same way.38 
Given the number of companies in the portfolio, and the legal pressures to vote 
shares, the role inevitably includes a compliance function. Simply voting the shares, 
without even considering how to vote them, is an enormous task. In addition, especially 
in recent years and especially at the largest institutional investors, these groups have 
become increasingly active in corporate governance. From an incentive perspective, 
however, these activities are not treated as an investment function: unlike portfolio 
managers, the compensation of governance professionals is not typically linked to the 
performance of the portfolios. 
 
 
Proxy voting groups at institutional investors invariably subscribe to the major 
proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis. From what one can tell from the outside, there 
is a significant difference in the use made of the information and recommendations of 
those services.39 At institutions with large in-house proxy voting groups, ISS and Glass 
Lewis are mainly useful as information aggregators.40 Smaller institutions seem to rely 
more heavily on the proxy advisory firms’ recommendations.41 
On high-value, high-profile issues such as contested mergers, proxy voting groups 
consult with the managers of the portfolios that hold the relevant shares. Otherwise, 
portfolio managers are typically less involved. Indeed, some report that portfolio 
managers sometimes oppose governance activism for fear that it may make it more 
difficult to arrange meetings with management. 
5. The promise of institutional shareholder activism 
The EU’s 2011 Green Paper accurately expresses the conventional view that “the 
corporate governance framework is built on the assumption that shareholders engage with 
companies and hold the management to account for its performance.”42 The frustration, 
going back at least as far as Berle and Means (1932), is that shareholders in public 
corporations with dispersed ownership do not perform that function. Much corporate law 
scholarship and policy making has focused on how to remedy or adapt to this failing.43 
The move towards ensuring that the board of directors is dominated by independent 
directors can best be understood as one type of solution to the lack of shareholder 
engagement: because shareholders themselves do not monitor managers, we need a new 
player in the boardroom to play that role for the benefit of passive shareholders. 
 
 
Likewise, for some, hostile tender offers can provide a lever of managerial accountability 
that passive shareholders do not supply. 
In the late 1980s, with the decline of the hostile tender offer, attention shifted to 
the rise of institutional investors as a potential solution to the separation of ownership and 
control. Institutional investors combined large stakes with professional management, at a 
time when the increased concentration of shareholdings reduced the costs of collective 
action. Perhaps, optimists thought, institutional investors would emerge from their 
historic lassitude that was summarized by the phrase “Wall Street Walk”: shareholders 
dissatisfied with management would (or should) sell their shares rather than engage in 
corporate governance activism. With the increased institutional holdings, perhaps 
institutional investors would emerge to provide the missing lever of corporate 
governance, to “hold the management to account for its performance.” 
6. How best to explain institutional investor passivity? Two 
competing hypotheses 
Given the traditional passivity of institutional investors, policy makers needed to 
understand why they had played so minor a role in corporate governance. Two 
explanations were offered: excessive regulation; and inadequate incentives. 
6.1 The “excessive regulation” hypothesis 
In the late 1980s, Mark Roe and Bernard Black separately catalogued the dizzying array 
of regulatory barriers to activism found in state corporate law, federal securities law, 
federal regulation of investment companies (mutual funds), state insurance company 
regulation, and pension regulation.44 Moreover, as Roe demonstrated, many of these 
 
 
barriers were erected as part of a political decision to prevent institutional investors from 
playing an active role in corporate governance. 
Together, these analyses implicitly proposed “excessive regulation” as the 
explanation for why institutional investors, despite their size and expertise, were not more 
active in corporate governance. If only these largely unnecessary regulations were 
reduced or eliminated, they seemed to suggest, we could expect institutions to take a 
more prominent role. 
6.2 The inadequate incentives hypothesis 
During this same period, other scholars argued that the source of institutional investor 
passivity was to be found in their lack of or misaligned incentives.45 Institutional 
investors are intermediaries, competing against each other for investors’ funds. Many of 
the largest institutions offer low-cost diversification, by tracking stock indices or the 
equivalent. 
This industry structure has a variety of implications, almost all of which point 
away from serious engagement with corporate governance. First, the market for money 
managers is highly competitive, with money flowing to funds offering higher returns. To 
the extent that competing funds track indices, superior returns can only come from 
lowering costs, leaving little money for activism. Outside of the hedge fund sector, 
discussed below, even “active managers” will typically only depart slightly from an 
indexing strategy.46 
Second, the costs of activism are borne by the activist while the benefits are 
enjoyed by all the shareholders, potentially leading to both “rational apathy” (when the 
private costs exceed the private benefits) and the “free rider problem” (when shareholders 
 
 
refuse to incur costs, hoping to benefit from other shareholders’ activism). As 
shareholding becomes more concentrated, and the costs of coordination among 
shareholders drops, both of which have occurred in the last 20 years, shareholders can 
capture more of the gains, allowing them to move beyond rational apathy. 
Third, institutional investors’ revenue model is typically a percentage of assets 
under management. In such a system, the dominant incentive is to increase fund or fund 
complex size. This can be done via a variety of avenues, including both marketing and 
performance. There is thus a link with fund performance, but it will be indirect. 
Fourth, money managers may have perverse incentives with regard to activism: to 
the extent that funds depart from an index, but still compete with managers of similar 
funds, a fund’s relative performance improves when “underweighted” companies in their 
portfolio perform badly.47 If Fund A has 4% of X Corp and 2% of Y Corp, and competes 
with Fund B, with 4% of X Corp and 4% of Y Corp, the worse that Y Corp performs, the 
better Fund A’s relative performance vis-à-vis Fund B. Indeed, to the extent that relative 
performance is determinative, Fund A would have a financial incentive to vote against a 
merger that would benefit Y Corp or elect incompetent directors. 
Fifth, consistent with the old “Wall Street Rule,” noted above, portfolio managers 
still believe that involvement in everyday corporate governance is a tough way to make 
money and would prefer to devote their efforts to selecting better investments. Moreover, 
corporate governance activism can make it difficult for portfolio managers to gain access 
to the management of portfolio companies, making their jobs more difficult. 
Finally, asset managers face a variety of conflicts of interests. It is difficult to 
compete for corporate pension business while criticizing the company. When the asset 
 
 
manager is part of a larger group including an investment bank, the bankers may pressure 
asset managers not to antagonize current or prospective clients by, for example, voting 
against the CEO’s pay.48 
6.3 A natural experiment: partial deregulation of institutional investors 
In the years since 1990, concentration of ownership has continued to increase and many 
of the regulations that Black and Roe identified have been relaxed. Thus, the 1992 reform 
of the proxy rules allows institutions to talk with other institutions about the performance 
of the management without fear of liability for improper solicitation of proxies.49 
Regulation Fair Disclosure, effective in 2000, prevents corporate managers from 
punishing active investors by providing selective disclosure of important information 
only to friendly portfolio managers, thereby protecting active shareholders from at least 
one form of retribution.50 
Yet institutional investors have not emerged as shareholders’ champion. While 
not conclusive, the evidence strongly suggests that the primary explanation for 
institutional investor passivity is inadequate incentives, rather than excessive regulation. 
7. Can we fix the incentive problems? 
7.1 The European Commission’s 2014 proposed amendment to the 
Shareholder Rights Directive 
The European Commission, as reflected in the opening quote, has been frustrated by the 
same shareholder passivity that has frustrated US observers.51 In its recent proposal to 
amend the Shareholder Rights Directive,52 it observed that: 
 
 
The financial crisis has revealed that shareholders in many cases supported 
managers’ excessive short-term risk taking. Moreover, there is clear 
evidence that the current level of “monitoring” of investee companies and 
engagement by institutional investors and asset managers is sub-optimal. 
Institutional investors and their asset managers do not sufficiently focus on 
the real (long-term) performance of companies, but often on share-price 
movements and the structure of capital market indexes, which leads to 
suboptimal return for the end beneficiaries of institutional investors and 
puts short-term pressure on companies. 
Short-termism appears to be rooted in a misalignment of interests 
between asset owners and asset managers. Even though large asset owners 
tend to have long-term interests as their liabilities are long-term, for the 
selection and evaluation of asset managers they often rely on benchmarks, 
such as market indexes. Moreover, the performance of the asset manager 
is often evaluated on a quarterly basis. As a result many asset managers’ 
main concern has become their short-term performance relative to a 
benchmark or to other asset managers. Short-term incentives turn focus 
and resources away from making investments based on the fundamentals 
(strategy, performance and governance) and longer-term perspectives, 
from evaluating the real value and longer-term value creative capacity of 




To address this lack of engagement, the Commission has proposed a variety of measures, 
including the requirement that institutional investors and asset managers develop and 
disclose (on a “comply or explain basis”) a policy on shareholder engagement that 
addresses how institutional investors and asset managers will take action: “(a) to integrate 
shareholder engagement in their investment strategy; (b) to monitor investee companies, 
including on their non-financial performance; (c) to conduct dialogues with investee 
companies; (d) to exercise voting rights; (e) to use services provided by proxy advisors; 
(f) to cooperate with other shareholders.”54 In addition, institutional investors would be 
expected to disclose the results of their policies, how they vote and general meetings, and 
an explanation for how they vote.55 The proposal also seeks to encourage institutional 
investors to incentivize asset managers to manage for the medium- to long-term 
performance of assets.56 
Are these attempts to encourage or force institutional investors to play a more 
significant and productive role in corporate governance likely to succeed? In this regard, 
it is worth reviewing the US experience with a very similar set of reforms. 
7.2 The 1988–2013 mutual fund “experiment”: imposing obligations on 
mutual funds 
In 1988, the Department of Labor issued the legendary “Avon Letter” which declared that 
proxy voting rights are plan assets subject to the same fiduciary standards as other plan 
assets.57 In subsequent letters, the DOL amplified on this responsibility.58 Since then, the 
SEC has repeatedly made clear that, under the Investment Company Act and Investment 
Advisors Act, the voting of proxies is a matter of money managers’ fiduciary duties. 
 
 
The SEC raised the stakes in 2003 when it promulgated two related releases that 
together imposed an obligation to disclose proxy voting policies and proxy votes on 
registered investment management companies (the managers of mutual funds) and 
investment advisors (the individuals who work for the managers of mutual funds).59 In 
promulgating these new rules, the SEC focused on (1) mutual funds’ large holdings; (2) 
advisors’ and investment management companies’ fiduciary obligations to their investors 
to vote proxies responsibly and in the interests of the investors; (3) mutual funds’ historic 
passivity; and (4) the potential for conflicts of interest between mutual funds duties to 
their investors and their commercial interests. One can almost feel the SEC’s frustration 
that, despite 15 years of emphasizing money managers’ fiduciary responsibility to vote 
proxies, nothing much had changed. 
The SEC justified imposing new obligations on mutual funds on two grounds: (1) 
investors’ “fundamental right” to information on how mutual funds vote and (2) the ways 
in which transparency will allow investors to hold mutual funds accountable for how they 
vote, thereby controlling conflicts of interest and inducing more responsible 
“stewardship”: 
Proxy voting decisions by funds can play an important role in maximizing 
the value of the funds’ investments, thereby having an enormous impact 
on the financial livelihood of millions of Americans. Further, shedding 
light on mutual fund proxy voting could illuminate potential conflicts of 
interest and discourage voting that is inconsistent with fund shareholders’ 
best interests. Finally, requiring greater transparency of proxy voting by 
funds may encourage funds to become more engaged in corporate 
 
 
governance of issuers held in their portfolios, which may benefit all 
investors and not just fund shareholders.60 
Further, the SEC seemed to expect that disclosure of mutual fund proxy voting would 
lead investors to choose funds based on how active they are in corporate governance: 
A number of commenters, including an overwhelming number of 
individual investors, strongly supported the Commission’s proposal to 
require a fund to disclose its complete proxy voting record. Many of these 
commenters stated that this disclosure would improve shareholders’ ability 
to monitor funds’ voting decisions on their behalf and that it would allow 
investors to make more informed decisions when choosing among funds . . 
. 
After careful consideration of these comments, we continue to 
believe that requiring funds to disclose their complete proxy voting 
records will benefit investors by improving transparency and enabling 
fund shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance 
activities of portfolio companies.61 
In addition, the SEC expected that “more conscientious” mutual fund voting would lead 
to increases in firm value: 
A third significant benefit of the amendments comes from providing 
stronger incentives to fund managers to vote their proxies conscientiously. 
The amendments could increase the incentives for fund managers to vote 
their proxies carefully, and thereby improve corporate performance and 
enhance shareholder value. The improved corporate performance that 
 
 
could result from better decisionmaking in corporate governance matters 
may benefit fund investors. In addition, other equity holders may benefit 
from the improvement to corporate governance that results from more 
conscientious proxy voting by fund managers. We note that assets held in 
equity funds account for approximately 18% of the $11 trillion market 
capitalization of all publicly traded US corporations, and therefore funds 
exercise a considerable amount of influence in proxy votes affecting the 
value of these corporations.62 
Further, the release provided guidance on what sort of proxy voting policies mutual funds 
should have: 
We do expect, however, that funds’ disclosure of their policies and 
procedures will include general policies and procedures, as well as 
policies with respect to voting on specific types of issues. The following 
are examples of general policies and procedures that some funds include 
in their proxy voting policies and procedures and with respect to which 
disclosure would be appropriate: 
• The extent to which the fund delegates its proxy voting decisions to its 
investment adviser or another third party, or relies on the 
recommendations of a third party; 
• Policies and procedures relating to matters that may affect substantially 
the rights or privileges of the holders of securities to be voted; and 
• Policies regarding the extent to which the fund will support or give weight 
to the views of management of a portfolio company. 
 
 
The following are examples of specific types of issues that are covered by 
some funds’ proxy voting policies and procedures and with respect to 
which disclosure would be appropriate: 
• Corporate governance matters, including changes in the state of 
incorporation, mergers and other corporate restructurings, and anti-
takeover provisions such as staggered boards, poison pills, and 
supermajority provisions; 
• Changes to capital structure, including increases and decreases of capital 
and preferred stock issuance; 
• Stock option plans and other management compensation issues; and 
• Social and corporate responsibility issues.63 
Finally, the SEC gave advice on how funds might handle conflicts of interest: 
Advisers today use various means of ensuring that proxy votes are voted 
in their clients’ best interest and not affected by the advisers’ conflicts of 
interest. An adviser that votes securities based on a pre-determined voting 
policy could demonstrate that its vote was not a product of a conflict of 
interest if the application of the policy to the matter presented to 
shareholders involved little discretion on the part of the adviser. Similarly, 
an adviser could demonstrate that the vote was not a product of a conflict 
of interest if it voted client securities, in accordance with a pre-determined 
policy, based upon the recommendations of an independent third party. An 
adviser could also suggest that the client engage another party to 
 
 
determine how the proxies should be voted, which would relieve the 
adviser of the responsibility to vote the proxies.64 
7.3 The effects of the SEC release 
Mutual funds complied with the requirements of the release. They now have proxy voting 
guidelines65 and disclose their proxy voting.66 Not surprisingly, funds have adopted 
voting guidelines that rather closely follow the SEC guidelines for what such guidelines 
should look like. Thus, guidelines typically take positions on general governance matters 
like classified boards, independent directors, anti-takeover provisions, and compensation. 
Note how the SEC’s release shapes the substance of mutual funds’ engagement. 
By describing “best practices” for proxy voting guidelines, the SEC has effectively 
mandated a particular “guidelines” approach to shareholder engagement, and rejected the 
perfectly respectable view that governance is endogenous to firms. It would take an 
unusually assertive and brave mutual fund to announce the following (entirely fictional) 
approach: 
We believe that there are no general principles or best practices in 
corporate governance. Rather, we believe that optimal governance 
depends on firm specific factors and that market pressures, even in the 
absence of regulation, drive most firms to adopt optimal governance 
arrangements. In addition, we believe that most shareholder voting is 
irrelevant to firm value, a distraction to corporate management, and does 
not contribute (and can interfere with) maximizing the financial 
performance of your fund. Therefore, we will routinely vote with 
management unless we become aware of a specific problem at a particular 
 
 
company. In those cases, we will decide how to vote on a case by case 
basis, taking into account all factors and discussing issues with 
management and other shareholders. 
I am not aware of any funds that have announced this approach, even though such an 
approach, many believe, would be optimal for investors in widely diversified funds. 
The SEC, in emphasizing money managers’ fiduciary duties, and the extent to 
which conflicts of interest may breach those duties, created a compliance challenge. By 
then indicating that reliance on guidelines or a predetermined policy of voting based on 
“the recommendations of an independent third party,” the SEC gave a boost to “guideline 
based voting” (noted above), as well as to the proxy advisory industry. A subscription to 
ISS and Glass Lewis can be viewed as a kind of “ERISA insurance.”67 
So the SEC achieved its immediate goal, namely the routine disclosure of proxy 
voting policies and proxy votes. But has this disclosure led investors to choose funds 
based on those policies or votes? And has this new disclosure mandate increased firm 
value? 
I have not found any evidence that investors seeking to maximize returns pay any 
attention to either the policies or the votes. In particular, I cannot find any evidence that 
investors choose funds based on how the fund voted its proxies. There is, however, 
evidence that labor and environmental groups use the voting reports to determine whether 
mutual funds comply with the groups’ guidelines, and to criticize those that do not.68 
Further evidence of compliance with the SEC requirements, and of the 
transformation of proxy voting into a “compliance function,” is the creation of “proxy 
voting groups” at large mutual fund complexes, described above, staffed with people 
 
 
whose compensation does not depend on the performance of the companies or funds for 
which they vote proxies. The very existence of these groups indicates portfolio managers’ 
lack of interest in voting routine proxies (although they clearly do weigh in on major 
decisions like mergers). Given that portfolio managers select investments and are judged 
based on the performance of the investments they select, this itself is strong evidence that 
an individual fund’s routine proxy voting does not have any measurable effect on 
performance. The lack of incentive compensation for proxy voting groups eliminates any 
straightforward “pay for performance” penalty for votes that reduce firm value. Although 
mutual funds reliably support “performance compensation” for portfolio companies 
because of the incentive effects, proxy voting groups are not, themselves, compensated in 
this way. 
With ten years of experience with the SEC’s mutual fund release, we can begin to 
measure the effect of these mandates on firm value. The preliminary results are not 
encouraging. In an important paper, Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2014) use the 
Dodd-Frank mandated “say on pay” votes to study the impact of proxy advisory firms on 
shareholder voting and firm value.69 Their key findings are: 
First, consistent with prior research, proxy advisory firm recommendations 
have a substantive impact on say-on-pay voting outcomes. Second, a 
substantial number of firms change their compensation programs in the 
time period before the formal shareholder vote in a manner consistent with 
the features known to be favored by proxy advisory firms in an effort to 
avoid a negative voting recommendation. Third, the stock market reaction 
to these compensation program changes is statistically negative.70 
 
 
The first two findings support the conventional wisdom. Consistent with other research, 
the recommendations by ISS and Glass-Lewis have a significant effect on how mutual 
funds vote. The second finding confirms that, when proxy advisory recommendations 
matter, portfolio firms will tailor their conduct to comply and thereby avoid a negative 
recommendation. 
The most important, and intriguing, finding is the third; namely, that complying 
with ISS guidelines to avoid a negative recommendation is correlated with a decline in 
firm value. Larcker et al. interpret this result as suggesting that “the outsourcing of voting 
to proxy advisory firms appears to have the unintended economic consequence that 
boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease shareholder value.”71 An 
alternative explanation for the results is that firms identify themselves as out of 
compliance with proxy advisory firm recommendations by disclosing these changes, and 
that “lack of compliance” is evidence that firms are badly governed, leading to a fall in 
stock price. If, however, this were the explanation, then one would predict that future 
performance of these firms would decline; Larcker et al., however, show that this is not 
the case. As interesting and suggestive as these results are, more research is clearly 
needed to determine whether and to what extent proxy advisory firms’ recommendations 
are value increasing or decreasing. 
What can we learn from the last 25 years during which the US has experimented 
with using fiduciary duties and disclosure to induce mutual funds, an important subset of 
institutional investors, to be more active in corporate governance? The most immediate 
lessons are discouraging. While regulation clearly changes behavior—it led mutual funds 
to adopt proxy voting guidelines, to disclose their proxy voting, and to subscribe to proxy 
 
 
advisory services—it failed to achieve its core goal, namely, transforming mutual funds 
into shareholders’ champions that assume a role in corporate governance commensurate 
with their shareholdings. Indeed, in an example of the law of unintended consequences, 
the effects of the effort may well be negative on the core measure of firm value. Not 
surprisingly, the fundamental incentive structure outlined above—in which institutional 
investors, as intermediaries, have minimal incentives to become active in corporate 
governance—seems to undermine even the best-intended regulatory intervention. It is 
very difficult to force anyone to be free. 
There is little reason to believe that the European Commission’s proposals will 
fare any better. If enacted, one can predict that institutional investors and asset managers 
will reliably comply (rather than explain why they did not), will dutifully create and 
disclose policies for engagement, and will disclose their votes at general meetings. 
Likewise, one can predict that institutional investors will turn to proxy advisors for 
assistance. Finally, one suspects that this greater engagement will not increase firm or 
portfolio value. 
8. The new reality: institutional investors and activist hedge funds 
But these negative assessments may be too quick. Although traditional institutional 
investors have not emerged as active “stewards,” there has been a more modest, although 
still important, change in institutional investor behavior: institutional investors are 
engaging with management in a much more active way than ever before; and, rather than 
always supporting management, institutional investors are now willing to support hedge 
funds and other corporate governance activists when they are convinced that doing so 
will increase firm value.72 As one hedge fund manager explains, “The brute force of 
 
 
ownership is not required anymore because the big institutional players listen to both 
sides and are willing to back the activist fund if they believe in them . . . You can win 
with persuasion and ideas.”73 
Hedge fund activists include some familiar names from the 1980s like Carl Icahn 
and Nelson Peltz, as well as newer players like Bill Ackman, Daniel Loeb, and Jana 
Partners. Although exact figures are hard to come by, Icahn is said to have $20 billion 
available,74 while Ackman has around $12 billion.75 Overall, corporate activist hedge 
funds are estimated to have a total of around $100 billion.76 While these are very large 
sums, they are small relative to the amounts managed by the largest institutional investors 
such as BlackRock ($3.7 trillion), State Street ($2 trillion), Vanguard ($1.8 trillion), or 
Fidelity ($1.6 trillion). They are also small relative to the market capitalization of the 
largest companies. As of January 31, 2014, the median market cap for the S & P 500 was 
$16 billion; the smallest market cap was $3 billion; the largest $450 billion.77 
Hedge funds, in contrast to traditional institutional investors, engage with 
particular companies over firm-specific issues. Their activities can usefully be divided 
into corporate governance activism (e.g., pressuring management over business issues 
such as asking management to spin off a division, nominating a “short slate” of directors, 
and pushing for changes in corporate financing such as buying back stock or paying a 
dividend), and corporate control activism (e.g., blocking acquirers from completing a 
merger, blocking targets from agreeing to a merger, pushing the board to sell the 
company, and even making bids for the company). 
The biggest difference between hedge funds and traditional institutional investors 
is hedge funds’ business model. For traditional institutions, activism, when it occurs, is a 
 
 
response to unexpected and undesired problems that emerge in portfolio companies. Once 
problems arise, institutional investors must decide whether to sell the position (the “Wall 
Street Walk”), to intervene to improve it, or to do nothing. As we saw above, institutional 
investors’ incentives to intervene are very weak. 
By contrast, for activist hedge funds, activism is ex ante and strategic.78 Activists 
first identify a problematic company, then decide whether intervention can improve 
matters. If activists conclude that an intervention is warranted, they buy a stake in order 
to intervene. When combined with high-powered performance-based incentives (typically 
between 1% and 2% of money under management plus between 15% and 20% of gains), 
hedge funds, unlike traditional institutions, have strong financial incentives to get 
involved. When an engagement is effective, the gains to the hedge fund can be huge. 
Moreover, activist hedge funds typically do not have the same conflicts of interest as 
institutional investors, as they do not sell money management services to portfolio 
companies. 
The links between activist hedge funds and traditional institutional investors are 
critical to understanding hedge funds’ influence and institutional investors’ contemporary 
roles in corporate governance. First, because activist hedge funds do not have sufficiently 
large positions to prevail in medium or large cap companies, they must convince the 
other shareholders—mainly the traditional institutional investors—to support them. 
Hedge funds play an important “catalyst” role in facilitating shareholder action. 
Second, the border between the “investor” side and the “issuer” side has become 
increasingly permeable, with increasing mobility of corporate governance professionals 
between the investor and issuer “sides” of the table. Stephen Brown, Director of 
 
 
Corporate Governance at TIAA-CREF, recently became the CEO of the Society of 
Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals.79 Bess Joffe, by contrast, left 
Goldman Sachs to become Managing Director of Corporate Governance at TIAA-
CREF.80 Linda Scott, managing director at Governance for Owners and, before that, 
Director of Corporate Governance at TIAA-CREF, is now SVP and Associate Corporate 
Secretary at JPMorgan Chase.81 Abe Friedman, founder and managing partner of 
CamberView Partners, a boutique advisory firm that advises issuers, came from 
BlackRock. Chris Young, after six years as Director of M & A and Proxy Fight Research 
at ISS, is now managing director and head of contested situations at Credit Suisse where 
he advises issuers.82 And, of course, John Wilcox, after a long career at the leading proxy 
solicitor Georgeson, became SVP and head of corporate governance at TIAA-CREF, and 
is now chairman of Sodali, Ltd., which works with issuers in developing institutional 
investor relationships.83 
Third, and critically, a significant (but undisclosed) amount of activist hedge fund 
capital is raised from traditional institutions. According to the 2010 Conference Board 
report, hedge fund and other alternative investment assets have grown from under $2 
billion in 1990 to around $1.5 trillion in 2009.84 This growth has been fueled by 
institutional investment. As of 2009, the largest 200 defined benefit plans had invested 
around $70 billion in hedge funds alone.85 
Institutional investor investment in activist hedge funds potentially align interests 
in a variety of interesting ways. First, it insulates institutional investors from criticism by 
those opposed to the activists’ agenda, and avoids antagonizing portfolio companies and 
incurring the wrath of portfolio managers. Second, encouraging activism through hedge 
 
 
funds allows for much higher-powered financial incentives than would be politically 
acceptable within institutional investors. Third, the arrangement allows for a division of 
labor, with the hedge funds developing expertise in pressuring management. Having 
induced activism through investments in hedge funds, institutional investors quite 
reasonably may choose to take a more passive reactive role. Fourth, the investments 
partially align the financial interests of the institutional investor and the hedge fund. 
Finally, major institutional investors only invest in hedge funds after significant due 
diligence. The process associated with institutional investors’ investment in hedge funds 
provides some assurance to the general investing public of the activists’ bona fides. 
Institutional investors are now far more willing to consider proposals for change made by 
the activist hedge funds than they used to be. 
At the same time, hedge funds’ high-powered financial incentives create grounds 
for concern. Hedge funds exist to make money, and will likely attempt to do so, whether 
or not it benefits shareholders as a group. Thus, for example, hedge funds have sought to 
acquire companies and, of course, sought to do so at the lowest possible cost. Hedge 
funds have also used tactics such as “empty voting” that serve the hedge funds’ interest at 
the expense of the other shareholders.86 
The potential constraints induced by the need to form a coalition can be usefully 
illustrated by the Air Products/Air Gas battle.87 In 2012, Air Products, an industrial gas 
producer, launched a hostile bid for Air Gas, a supplier of gas delivered in canisters. Air 
Gas, which had a staggered board and a poison pill, resisted Air Products’ above market 
bid on the grounds that it undervalued the company. Eventually, Air Products launched a 
proxy fight to elect a short slate of directors. Air Products nominated three independent 
 
 
directors who were committed to taking a “second look.” After prevailing in a hard-
fought contest, with support of ISS, hedge funds, and traditional institutions, the newly 
elected directors, with separate counsel and investment banking advice, surprised many 
by concluding that the Air Products offer, though a premium above market value, 
substantially undervalued Air Gas, and became the most vociferous proponents of 
resisting the Air Products offer. Air Products ultimately refused to raise its offer, and the 
bid failed. Air Gas’s stock price has remained above the offer price and, in fact, has 
increased nearly 50%. The newly elected outside directors seem to have been right. 
From a corporate governance perspective, one of the most interesting features of 
the battle was that Air Products did, in fact, identify and elect genuinely independent 
directors and not a slate committed to selling the company.88 The best explanation one 
heard for this “unusual” tactic is that the institutions and the hedge funds that held Air 
Gas shares were genuinely unsure of the value of Air Gas, and would not have supported 
a more partisan slate. 
The world has changed when F. William McNabb, III, chairman and CEO of 
Vanguard, publicly salutes certain interventions by activist hedge funds: 
The nature of activist investing has changed significantly since the 1980s. 
Today, we’re seeing a greater trend toward constructive activists rather 
than destructive activists. Activists are not inherently good or bad. They 
often raise legitimate questions. 
And when they raise legitimate questions and tie their business 
cases to long-term shareholder value—that gets our attention. There have 
been a number of cases where a board wasn’t asking the right questions 
 
 
and eventually lost touch with how the company was being run, and how it 
was being perceived by investors. I’ll share two instances where Vanguard 
has sided with activist campaigns in recent years. 
• Canadian Pacific Railway: In 2012, activist Bill Ackman went in and 
identified some vulnerabilities in Canadian Pacific Railway. We agreed—
as did many other large investors—that the company had been poorly run 
and governed. Ackman brought in an experienced CEO and a number of 
directors they thought could make a difference. It’s been an activist 
success story—by and large. 
• Commonwealth REIT: Another example of us supporting an activist: Earlier 
this year, Corvex and Related Companies waged a successful campaign to 
replace the entire board of Commonwealth REIT. This was a company 
with a track record of poor performance and poor governance, and they 
were ultimately held accountable. Commonwealth was using a third-party 
management firm, RMR, that was run by family members of 
Commonwealth leadership. RMR extracted value from the public 
company. They didn’t operate it well, but they were paid well nonetheless. 
We supported wiping the slate clean. In the case of Commonwealth, we 
were the largest shareholder. We were important to Corvex’s case, but at 
the end of the day, I don’t think they needed us. 81% of Commonwealth 
shareholders voted to remove the company’s board.89 
The constraining effects of coalition building have some interesting implications. We 
should be more worried about cases in which hedge funds can act on their own than when 
 
 
a coalition with other shareholders is required. Thus, for example, the squeeze-out 
threshold in the EU for completing a takeover under the Takeover Directive (95% in 
Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands; 90% in Spain, Sweden, and the 
UK)90 is an invitation to hedge funds to acquire a blocking position. Especially at the 
95% level, it would seem close to “hedge fund malpractice” not to buy a blocking 
position, especially in private equity deals in which the sponsor’s financing requires 
owning 100%. Similar hold-out problems can be created by “majority of the minority” 
provisions, whether in a controlling shareholder context or a management sponsored 
LBO. This suggests that such provisions should be used sparingly. It also raises the 
possibility that the doctrinal effect of such provisions should be revisited.91 
9. Conclusion 
The preceding discussion suggests that, try as we might, we are unlikely to transform 
institutional investors into “stewards” of portfolio companies. The emergence of activist 
hedge funds raises an even more fundamental question that applies equally to institutional 
investors: do we, as a society, actually want shareholders to act like owners? Highly 
incentivized, focused actors can be and often are socially disruptive. In the US during the 
1980s, the disruption accompanying hostile tender offers resulted in anti-takeover 
legislation, as well as judicial decisions that limited shareholders’ ability to proceed 
unilaterally.92 Mark Roe’s political history of US corporate finance provides numerous 
examples of regulatory pacification of active or potentially active shareholders.93 
Whenever hedge funds have emerged as activists, they have produced a backlash as their 
single-minded, incentive-driven focus—whether on shareholder value maximization or 
 
 
blocking a transaction or exploiting ambiguities in bond contracts—has made people 
nervous. The rise of hedge funds in Europe has led to calls to constrain them.94 
When one reads the EU Green paper and the Commission’s proposal to reform 
the Shareholder Rights Directive, one gets the distinct impression that shareholders who 
act too much like shareholders, with single-minded focus on maximizing shareholder 
value today, are not what is sought. Too often, it seems, with a focus on maximizing 
profits, they push for unpleasant things like closing plants, moving work to China, firing 
employees, or putting competitors out of business. Rather, the EU seems to be searching 
for a very different sort of shareholder, a shareholder more like a rich uncle who, while 
demanding, is ultimately focused on doing what is best for the family as a whole, one 
who “can be encouraged to take an interest in sustainable returns and longer term 
performance” even at the cost of lower returns. The US experience makes clear that 
traditional institutions and hedge funds are not this sort of investor and it is unlikely that 
regulation can transform them into this sort of “patient capital.” 
Table 1 
Institutional Ownership concentration in the 25 largest US Corporations (by market 
value; as of 03/26/2010) 
Company Market value 
($millions) 





% held by top 
5 institutions 
% held by top 
10 
institutions 
% held by top 
20 
institutions 





$314,153.50 48.20% 13.40% 17.40% 22.80% 25% 
Microsoft 260,131.90 63.7 17.1 23.5 29.5 31.9 
Apple Inc. 209,379.00 70.8 18.5 26.2 34.5 37 







200,900.50 25 10.4 14.8 18.3 19.2 
General 
Electric Co. 
195,740.50 49.4 12.7 17 22.8 24.8 
Procter & 
Gamble Co. 




179,572.90 54.9 14.9 20.3 26.8 28.9 
Google, Inc. 179,104.10 79.6 21.5 32.2 41.4 44.1 
JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. 
178,865.00 73.3 17.9 25.6 33 35.8 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
177,169.10 63.9 14.9 20.1 27.3 29.6 
IBM Corp. 167,909.10 61.3 15.3 20.9 28.1 30.6 
Wells Fargo 
& Co. 
161,742.30 75.2 21.7 32.9 41.5 44.3 
AT&T Inc. 154,870.40 55.1 16.9 23 29.1 31.4 
Cisco 
Systems, Inc. 
151,500.30 73.4 17.5 24.1 31.3 33.8 
Chevron 
Corp. 
149,481.70 62.2 17.2 22.3 29.1 31.7 
Pfizer Inc. 138,285.20 69.7 16.9 22.9 30.5 33.2 




125,975.00 63.5 23.6 32.5 38.4 40.4 
Hewlett-
Packard Co. 
125,274.90 77.4 19 27.6 36.3 39.4 
Citigroup 
Inc. 
123,088.90 37.8 13.4 17.9 22.1 23.5 
Intel Corp. 122,853.80 63.2 15.3 20.6 27.6 30 
Merck & Co., 
Inc. 
116,606.30 73.4 21.6 33.3 41.3 43.8 
 
 




97,215.10 71.7 22.7 30 37.7 40.4 
Goldman 
Sachs Group 
91,077.10 54.9 18.8 27.4 36.4 39.2 
 
                                                 
1 Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Many thanks to Glenn Booraem, Georg Ringe, and to participants in the 
Columbia Law School authors’ workshop for helpful comments and suggestions. 
2 EU Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework, COM(2011)164 final 
(2011) at 3, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf. 
3 Robert Clark, Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Treatises, 94 Harv. 
L. Rev. 561 (1981). 
4 There is a large literature. For an insightful recent contribution, see Ronald Gilson & 
Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and 
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013). Earlier 
contributions include: Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 
Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990); John Coffee, Liquidity versus Control: The 
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991); 
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Investor 
Activism, 79 Geo. L. J. 445 (1991); Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: 
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811 (1991); Mark 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 
(1991); Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (1996). 
5 Matteo Tonello & Stephan Rahim Rabimov, The 2010 Institutional Investment Report: 
Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition (November 11, 2010) 
(Conference Board Research Report), No. R-1468-10-RR, 2010 at p. 22 tbl.10, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707512. 
6 Conference Board Research Report, supra note 5, at 8, Chart 2a. 
7 Conference Board Research Report, supra note 5, at 27, Tbl. 13, Chart 14. 
8 Conference Board Research Report, supra note 5, at 29, Tbl. 16. 
9 For an overview of these developments, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4 at 878–884. 
10 See, e.g., https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/vanguard-mutual-funds-
list?assetclass=stk. 
11 Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: The Future of 
Securities Regulation (October 24, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc. htm). 







                                                                                                                                                 








18 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 Va. L. Rev. 
1347, 1377–79 (2011). 
19 Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (1993). 
20 Barry Burr, Money Managers Increasing Activism on Governance—But Quietly, 
Pensions & Investments, March 19, 2012, available at  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230394970457946177330455868
0; David Benoit & Liz Hoffman, BlackRock’s Fink Sounds the Alert, Wall St. 
Journal March 25, 2014, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230394970457946177330455868
0. 
21 Tonello & Rabimov, supra note 5, at 30. 
22 BlackRock, 2013 Corporate Governance and Responsible Investing Report: Taking the 
Long View at 5, available at http://blackrock.uberflip.com/i/300264. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Id. at 8. 
24 BlackRock, Proxy Voting Guidelines for US Securities (2014), available at 
http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-
investment-guidelines-us.pdf. 













28 State Street Global Advisors, Proxy Voting and Engagement Principles at 3 (March 





                                                                                                                                                 




30 Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-
voting/voting-guidelines. 
31 Id. at 7. 
32 Glenn Booraem, Passive investors, not passive owners, available at 
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/insights/article/proxy-commentary-042013. 
33 https://www.conference-board.org/bio/index.cfm?bioid=2944; see also, Glen Booraem, 
Controller at Vanguard, C-SUITE Daily, June 25, 2014, available at 
http://www.csuiteinsight.com/2014/06/interview-with-glenn-booraem/. 











                                                                                                                                                 
37 Daniel Oh (VP, Americas, Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment, 
BlackRock), LinkedIn profile supra note 27; Edward Gehl (Director of Proxy 






38 CalPERS global proxy voting policy, available at https://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-
docs/investments/policies/shareowner/proxy-voting-policy/global-proxy-
voting.pdf; CalSTRS Names Head of Corporate Governance, 
http://www.calstrs.com/news-release/calstrs-names-head-corporate-governance 
(September 4, 2008). 
39 Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch, & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds 
Vote on Director Elections, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 301, 313–29 (2013). 
40 See, e.g., Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines at 1; State Street’s 2014 Global Proxy 
Voting and Engagement Principles at 3 (“SSgA retains Institutional Shareholder 
Services Inc. (‘ISS’), a firm with expertise in proxy voting and corporate 
governance. SSgA utilizes ISS’s services in three ways: (1) as SSgA’s proxy 
voting agent (providing SSgA with vote execution and administration services); 
(2) for applying the Guidelines; and (3) as providers of research and analysis 
(relating to general corporate governance issues and specific proxy items”). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Choi, Fisch, & Kahan, supra note 39, 316–328. 
42 Green Paper 2011, supra note 2, 3. See, also, Michel Barnier, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/barnier/docs/speeches/20101025/speech_en.pdf: “Last but not least, 
shareholders must play their role fully. Too often, shareholders are only interested 
in the highest possible dividends. That is understandable but it fuels short-
termism. We have spoken for years about shareholders rights. It is time to also 
talk about shareholders’ obligations. All these measures put together will make a 
difference and lead to better corporate governance in companies, to more 
responsibility and more accountability. We still need to debate how we put these 
measures in place–but I am clear we will not be able to rely only on voluntary 
codes.” 
Barnier is European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services and a Vice President 
of the European Commission. 
43 See, generally, J. Armour, H. Hansmann, & R. Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law (2nd ed., R. Kraakman et al. eds., 
2009). 
44 Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 4; Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners, supra 
note 4; Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 4; Black, Agents 
Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, supra note 4. 
45 Rock, supra note 4; Coffee, supra note 4; Jill Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will it 
Happen? Will it Work? 55 Ohio St. L. J. 1009 (1994). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Bloomberg Businessweek, How to Spot a Closet Index Fund, September 5, 2004, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2004-09-05/how-to-spot-a-
closet-index-fund; Chris Flood, UK Regulator urged to tackle “index clones,” 
September 24, 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d05e39e0-2467-
11e3-8905-00144feab7de.html#axzz3FmBfEgzt. 
47 Simon C. Y. Wong, How conflicts of interest thwart institutional investor stewardship, 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law (September 
2011), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925485. 
48 Id. 
49 United States, Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation of Communication 
among Shareholders, 1992, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 31,326, 
57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, Oct. 16. 
50 Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, 17 CFR Parts 240, 243, and 249, Release Nos. 33–7881, 34–43154, IC-
24599, File No. S7-31-99, RIN 3235-AH82, available at adopting release 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm. 
51 The EU efforts follow earlier efforts in the UK to develop a “Stewardship Code” to 
“enhance the quality of engagement between asset managers and companies to 
help improve long-term risk-adjusted returns to shareholders.” Financial 
Reporting Website, https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-
Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx (copy of 
Stewardship Code, first published in July 2010 and subsequently revised in 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
September 2012 is available on the FRC website). The Stewardship Code seems 
to have only had a modest impact on UK corporate governance. Iris H.-Y. Chiu, 
Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of Corporate 
Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 983 (2014). 
52 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the 
corporate governance statement, COM(2014) 213 final, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:213:FIN (April 9, 2014). 
53 Id. at 4. 
54 Id at Art. 3f(1) at p. 19. 
55 Id. at Art. 3f(3). 
56 Id. at Art. 3g at pp. 20–21. 
57 Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor, to 
Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Retirement Board, Avon Products Inc. (February 
23, 1988) (reprinted at 15 Pens. Rptr. (BNA) 391). 
58 For a useful summary of the evolution of the Department of Labor’s views, beginning 
in 1988, see Clifton Perry, Gathering Strength: The Reinforcement of Fiduciary 
Responsibility for Proxy Voting, Pension Consultants White Paper (October 
2004), available at http://www.pension-consultants.com/cimages/file_85.pdf; 
James McRitchie, Fiduciary Duty to Announce Votes (Part 2): Historical 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Background, at http://corpgov.net/2014/05/fiduciary-duty-announce-votes-part-2-
historical-background/#more-19148. 
59 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA—
2106, 68 FR 6585 (February 7, 2003); Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and 
Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 
Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922, 2003 SEC Lexis 3143 (2003). 
60 IC-25922 at *18. 
61 Id. at *28–*29. See, also, the SEC’s benefit cost analysis: 
The amendments to the registration statement and reporting forms that we 
are adopting will benefit fund investors, by providing them with access to 
information about how funds vote their proxies. 
First, the amendments will provide better information to investors 
who wish to determine: 
● to which fund managers they should allocate their capital, and 
● whether their existing fund managers are adequately maximizing the value of 
their shares. 
The investment adviser to a mutual fund is a fiduciary that owes the fund a 
duty of “utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure.” This fiduciary 
duty extends to all functions undertaken on the fund’s behalf, including 
the voting of proxies relating to the fund’s portfolio securities. An 
investment adviser voting proxies on behalf of a fund, therefore, must do 
so in a manner consistent with the best interests of the fund and its 
shareholders. The increased transparency resulting from proxy voting 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
disclosure may increase investors’ confidence that their fund managers are 
voting proxies in accordance with their fiduciary duties. Without 
disclosure about how the fund votes proxies, fund shareholders cannot 
evaluate this aspect of their managers’ performance. To the extent that 
investors choose among funds based on their proxy voting policies and 
records, in addition to other factors such as expenses, performance, and 
investment policies, investors will be better able to select funds that suit 
their preferences. Further, insofar as investors may over-emphasize certain 
of these factors, e.g., past performance, in selecting funds, it may be 
beneficial to provide additional information to use in selecting funds. On a 
related point, we anticipate that over time, commercial third-party 
information providers will offer services that will enable investors to 
better analyze proxy voting by funds. These developments will further 
facilitate the benefits to fund investors from proxy vote disclosure (Id. at 
*72–74; footnotes omitted). 
62 Id. at *75–*76 (footnote omitted). 
63 Id. at *23–*24. 
64 Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, IA-2106, 68 FR 6585 at *6588 (footnotes 
omitted). 
65 See, e.g., Vanguard’s at https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/voting-





                                                                                                                                                 
66 https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/how-our-funds-voted/. The report 
for Vanguard’s Index 500 fund (which tracks the S & P 500 index and thus has 
approximately 500 companies in it) runs to 256 pages. 
67 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate 
Governance, 33 J. Corp. L. 1, 16 (2007). 
68 See e.g. AFL CIO’s annual report: http://corpgov.net/2013/02/afl-cio-key-votes-
survey-results-for-2012/; also have pdf on file. See, also, 
http://proxydemocracy.org/. 
69 Larcker, David F., McCall, Allan L., & Ormazabal, Gaizka, Outsourcing Shareholder 
Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms (June 13, 2014). Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 119; Stanford University 
Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 14-27. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101453 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2101453. 
70 Id. at 1. 
71 Id. 
72 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1045 (2007); David Gelles & Michael J. De La 
Merced, New Alliances in Battle for Corporate Control, NY Times, March 18, 




                                                                                                                                                 
73 Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbarians at the Gate, a Force for Change, New York 
Times Dealbook, January 6, 2014, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/no-barbarians-at-the-gate-instead-a-
force-for-change/, quoting Gregory Taxin, president of $1.5 billion hedge fund 
Clinton Group and a co-founder of Glass Lewis & Company, a leading proxy 
advisor. 
74 Having returned outside investors’ money in 2011, Icahn relies on his own 
considerable resources: Forbes estimates his net worth at $20 billion. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2013/03/27/carl-icahn-unleashed-wall-
streets-richest-man-is-on-the-attack-just-ask-michael-dell/ 
75 Ackman’s Pershing Square L.P. Fund Rose 3.8% Last Month, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/02/04/ackmans-pershing-square-l-p-fund-
rose-3-8-last-month/?link=mtkw. 
76 Alexandra Stevenson, No Barbarians at the Gate, a Force for Change, New York 
Times Dealbook, January 6, 2014, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/no-barbarians-at-the-gate-instead-a-
force-for-change/). See also Beth Jinks and Laura Marcinek, Bankers Pitching 
Avoidance Advice as Activists Amass Record Cash, January 6, 2014 Bloomberg, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-06/bankers-pitching-
avoidance-advice-as-activists-amass-record-cash.html (estimating $89 billion in 
activist hedge funds as of the 2013 third quarter compared to $66 billion at the 
end of 2012). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 S & P Dow Jones Indices, S & P 500 fact sheet, available at 
http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500. 
78 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 


























84 Conference Board report at Chart 20 (p. 49). 
85 Conference Board Research Report, supra note 5, at p. 52, Tbl 20 (this category 
includes all hedge funds and is thus far broader than the subset of hedge funds 
that engage in corporate governance activism; at the same time, defined benefit 
plans are a small subset of institutional investors). 
86 See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 So. Cal. L. Rev. 811 (2006). 
87 For a full description, see Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 
(Del. Ch. 2011). 
88 As Chancellor Chandler pointed out, Air Products could have nominated a slate with 
strong priors in favor of selling, e.g., a slate of “three Bebchuks.” Id. At 16 A3d at 
123 n. 487. 
89 F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: Sharing Practical Governance 







                                                                                                                                                 
90 Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the Implementation of the Directive 
on Takeover Bids, SEC (2007) 268 (Brussels, 21.02.2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2007-02-
report_en.pdf. 
91 Relatedly, bond covenants that were arguably optimal in an era of passive bondholders 
and under-enforcement may result in suboptimal selective over-enforcement as 
hedge funds overcome bondholders’ classic collective action problems and 
exploit poorly drafted covenants, without having to convince institutional holders 
to join with them. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the 
Enforcement of Bond Covenants, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281 (2009). 
92 For a discussion of how a self-regulating market economy stresses social relationships 
in a way that inevitably produces public regulatory countermeasures in a 
democracy, see Jeffrey Gordon, Corporations, Markets and Courts, 91 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1931, 1971–1982 (1991) (using Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation as 
a lens through which to understand the Delaware Supreme Court’s restriction of 
hostile takeovers in Paramount v. Time). 
93 Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners, supra note 4. 
94 Alexandros Seretakis, Taming the Locusts? Embattled Hedge Funds in the EU, 10 
NYU J. L. & Bus. 115 (2013). 
